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La producción de azúcar ha constituido un importante sector en la economía exportadora del 
Perú desde el período colonial temprano. Este artículo analiza su evolución, sobre todo tras el 
inicio de su fase moderna, fechada a partir de mediados del siglo XIX, cuando se modernizó, se 
consolidó en la región costera septentrional y se concentró en fábricas que operaban con econo-
mías de escala. Su prosperidad, contribuyó, además, a la formación de una oligarquía que gobernó 
el país hasta 1968 y del partido populista, APRA, y su base electoral (el llamado «sólido Norte 
aprista»). La revolución militar de Velasco Alvarado nacionalizó la industria en la década de 1960 
y los cambios estructurales que sufrió posteriormente le condujeron a una grave crisis en los años 
ochenta que aún no ha superado. 
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If mining (silver, copper, oil) has constituted the bedrock of Peru’s economy 
over the long sweep of its history, sugar growing has been the other great generator 
of Andean wealth. This was particularly true for periods of the colonial period and, 
in more modern times, in the first half of the Twentieth Century when the industry 
reached its zenith. Indeed, during the Aristocratic Republic (1895-1930) and be-
yond, the political elite of the country —the so called forty families that would 
govern Peru for much of the century— was partially composed of several sugar 
planters who had come to dominate the political and economic landscape of the 
country’s north coast. From their ranks came many important political figures, in-
cluding several presidents as well as ministers, congressmen, and members of va-
rious boards of directors of important companies. And it was this constellation of 
power —an oligarchy or plutocracy if you will— that was targeted in 1968 by a 
group of military reformers bent on «de-feudalizing» Peru. They carried out the 
sweeping agrarian reform program that nationalized and cooperativized the sugar 
industry, thereby ending the longstanding preeminence of the sugar barons. 
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At the same time sugar planting over the centuries shaped the Peruvian social 
landscape in significant ways. The demographic disaster, provoked by the sixteenth 
century conquest of Peru that caused the collapse of the native population, opened 
the way for the importation of African slaves and the rise of slavery, particularly in 
the cultivation of sugar on the coast. There the combination of sugar and slavery 
created the great plantation system which became a hallmark in Peru, as it did in 
other parts of the Americas, if on a smaller scale than north coast Brazil or the Ca-
ribbean islands. The extensive rather than intensive nature of sugar production ser-
ved to concentrate and consolidate the land tenure system (latifundio) which, toget-
her with its specialization as a cash crop for export, formed the economic core of 
colonialism and later, after independence, the monocultural dependency that Andre 
Gunder Frank would call «the development of underdevelopment»1. 
A more positive impact of sugar production would be its proto-industrial na-
ture which, along with capital and entrepreneurship of the planters in the early 
decades of the Twentieth Century contributed to the dawn of manufacturing in 
the country, particularly in textiles, an early manifestation of Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI). In fact, it can be argued that the advance of the sugar in-
dustry in the early Twentieth Century promoted modernization not only in indus-
trialization, but also in other economic sectors such banking, finance and trade2. 
Finally, the modernizing and monopolistic character and evolution of the sugar 
industry along the north coast produced major socio-political dislocations that 
contributed to the rise of APRA (Alianza Revolucionaria Popular Americana) in 
the 1930s, the country’s first populist mass based political party which even to-
day continues to play an important role in Peruvian politics3. 
The origins of the sugar industry go back to the latter part of the Sixteenth 
Century when production was first introduced in the fertile river valleys of the 
otherwise barren, desert-like north coast by Spanish colonists. Because of the 
absence of rain fall due to the effects of the cold pacific current along the coast, 
agriculture has always depended upon networks of irrigation that drew water 
from the numerous rivers carrying seasonal rain fall down from the high Andes. 
Agriculture flourished in these semi-tropical and sun drenched valleys, producing 
bountiful yields for the great pre-Colombian peoples such as the Mochica and 
Chimu Empires which Karl Wittfogel called «hydraulic» civilizations4. The Spa-
nish colonists occupying these lands, depopulated by the demographic disaster 
———— 
 1 A. GUNDER FRANK, The Development of Underdevelopment. Capitalism and Underdeve-
lopment in Latin American History, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1966. 
 2 See A. QUIROZ, Deudas olvidadas. Instrumentos de Crédito en la Economía Colonial pe-
ruana, 1750-1820, Lima, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1993. 
 3 See P.F. KLAREN, Modernization, Dislocation and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian Apris-
ta Party, 1870-1930, Austin, Texas Univ. Press, 1973. 
 4 K. WITTFOGUEL, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, London, Ran-
dom House, 1981 (1ª ed. 1957). 
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and by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo’s Indian removal and resettlement policies 
(reducciones), established haciendas to produce European food stuffs such as 
bread, beef, mutton, wine and sugar for the growing Spanish towns along the 
coast. Sugar production, unlike these other products, however, required substan-
tial capital investment in labor for imported slaves and technology for the mills, 
cauldrons, tools, oxen and mules. These funds were loaned to would be planters 
by the church, various charities and even Indian communities at interest rates a 
little over seven percent. Since the crown prohibited the enslavement of the re-
maining Indian population on the grounds that the purpose of the conquest had 
been to convert them to Christianity, planters turned to the importation of slaves 
from Africa, the Caribbean or Northern South America5. 
At first north coast plantations were relatively small scale, but during the Se-
venteenth Century their size increased (land for both planting and, equally impor-
tant, for precious water rights), mostly at the expense of the remaining Indian 
communities. During the second half of the century plantations expanded rapidly 
in response to sharply rising sugar prices, doubling and even tripling their slave 
population. Slave labor was augmented by mestizo wage laborers who were in-
debted with cash advances in order to hold them on the estates, thereby introdu-
cing debt peonage into the region. A labor hierarchy soon emerged on the planta-
tions whereby the more valuable, Hispanized African slaves performed the ski-
lled operations like refining while mestizos and some Indians became field 
workers. In another feature of the north coast plantations, planters combined su-
gar growing with livestock raising, since the cane fields left fallow could be used 
as pasturage. Sugar production reached 6,180 tons between 1740 and 1794, 1,800 
of which were exported to Chile, Argentina, Panama and Guayaquil, the rest 
supplying the domestic market6. 
Skyrocketing prices during the second half of the Seventeenth Century led to 
the expansion of sugar growing to virtually all the coastal river valleys from 
Lambayeque in the north to Lima in the center. In the Trujillo region alone there 
were eighteen sugar plantations while several also appeared in the central and 
northern highlands, devoted mostly to chancaca (sugar cakes), molasses and cane 
alcohol. Among the most profitable and well run plantations in the country were 
those operated by the Jesuits (some 13), widely known for their efficiency and 
entrepreneurial skills7. 
The boom in sugar production finally came to an end in the early Eighteenth 
Century when prices dropped precipitously due to over expansion, competition 
and market saturation. Peru’s lucrative foreign markets in Northern South Ame-
———— 
 5 See F.P. BOSWER, African Slavery in Colonial Peru, 1524-1650, Stanford, Stanford Univ. 
Press, 1974. 
 6 H. ROJAS SENISSE, Peru: de exportador a importador de azucar, Lima, IPA, 1993, p. 17. 
 7 See N.P. CUSHNER, Lords of the Land: Sugar, Wine, and Jesuit Estates of Coastal Peru, 
1600-1767, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1980. 
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rica were taken over by Caribbean producers while the same occurred in the Ri-
ver Plate due to Brazilian contraband. Floods in the Sana and Lambayeque river 
valleys in 1720 and 1728 also damaged sugar growers who never completely 
recovered while increased taxes on agriculture by the Bourbon reformers later in 
the century further injured sugar producers. All of these factors combined to for-
ce many sugar plantations into debt and eventual bankruptcy and others to diver-
sify their operations into livestock, tobacco, cotton and rice production8. By the 
end of the colonial period sugarcane cultivation, once the colony’s greatest sour-
ce of wealth along the coast, had largely stagnated. Annual production amounted 
to about 5,800 metric tons, about 70 percent of which was consumed locally9. 
The ensuing wars for independence further damaged Peruvian sugar produ-
cers. Plantation capital equipment was lost and slaves were recruited by rebel and 
royalist forces alike while the slave trade, already declining in the late eighteenth 
century, was effectively closed off by Great Britain after 1810. In 1821 of the 
41,208 slaves in Peru, about 16,500 were employed on sugar plantations.10 After 
the war, shortages caused sugar prices to rise five fold between 1825 and 1829, 
momentarily stimulating the recovery of plantations, only to fall again to depres-
sed levels because production outpaced demand. Also the lucrative sugar market 
with Chile in exchange for wheat (bread), which had developed in the late Seven-
teenth Century after a devastating earthquake on the coast (1687), experienced 
numerous ups and downs during the post independence period. High post-war 
interest rates, which reached 24 percent, slowed recovery during the 1820s and 
1830s as well11. 
The fortunes of the sugar industry were revived during the economic bonanza 
of the guano boom from the 1840s12. While the three decade «rags to riches» 
story of guano was relatively short lived and squandered by a combination of 
mismanagement, foreign exploitation and widespread corruption, agriculture in 
general and sugar production in particular benefited directly or indirectly from 
the guano boom. For example, Peru was able to consolidate its large war-time 
internal debt. Many major beneficiaries of the government payoff reinvested their 
largesse in the purchase and modernization of languishing sugar plantations 
along the coast. According to Pablo Macera, during the administration of José 
———— 
 8 See S.E. RAMÍREZ, Provincial Patriarchs: Land Tenure and the Economics of Power in Co-
lonial Peru, Albuquerque, New Mexico Univ. Press, 1986. 
 9 B. ALBERT, An Essay on the Peruvian Sugar Industry, 1880-1922 and the Letters of Ronald 
Gordon, Administrator of the British Sugar Company in the Canete Valley, 1914-1919, Norwich, 
School of Social Studies, Univ. of East Anglia, 1976, p. 2. 
10 Ibidem, p. 3a. 
11 M.J. GONZÁLES, Plantation Agriculture and Social Control in Northern Peru, 1875-1933, 
Austin, Texas Univ. Press, 1985, pp. 20-1. 
12 See P. GOOTENBERG, Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Pos-
tindependence Peru, Princienton, Princentos Univ. Press, 1989. 
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Rufino Echenique (1851-1854), 13 to 16 million pesos were paid out to Peruvian 
bond holders, half of which was reinvested in coastal agriculture13. 
A potential blow to the industry was the emancipation of slavery declared in 
1854 by Echenique’s successor Ramon Castilla. He decreed that slaveholders be 
indemnified in the amount of 300 pesos per slave or liberto, a total of 7 million 
pesos to slaveholders in all. In anticipation of emancipation already many slave 
holders had lobbied the government to approve the importation of indentured 
servants from China. Between 1839 and 1851 the government paid out 450,000 
pesos in premiums to planters to begin to liberate their slaves14. In their place 
90,000 Chinese coolies were shipped to Peru between 1849 and 1874 as indentu-
red servants, mainly from Southern China through the port of Macao15. This was 
part of a larger process of out-migration from China which saw over a million 
Chinese emigrate abroad, the consequence of famine, rebellion (Taiping) and war 
(Opium) that left millions homeless. Many came to the Americas as indentures 
—Cuba, Mexico, Peru, United States— where they built railroads, dug guano 
and labored in sugar and other agricultural enterprises. In Peru they replaced the 
25,505 slaves emancipated and were an indication of the growth and prosperity 
of the sugar industry in the 1850s and 60s16. 
The industry also benefited in other ways from the Guano boom, which enri-
ched government coffers by millions of pesos. Interest rates fell by half to a level 
of 12 percent by 1854, lowering the cost of loans to planters for modernization 
and expansion of production. In addition the introduction of steam power helped 
open up international markets and lower transaction costs for Peruvian sugar, 
while the mining industry had yet to flourish, leaving sugar as the most attractive 
investment alternative for profits acquired from guano. Finally, the opening of 
the British market to foreign sugar served to stimulate demand and prices rose 
accordingly on average 4 percent annually during the 1860s and 1870s. The ups-
hot of easier credit, reinvestment of guano profits, technological innovations, 
rising prices and an adequate supply of cheap labor was in an enormous increase 
in exports from 3,431 tons in 1867 to 83,497 tons in 187917. 
Tied as it was to the fortunes of the guano boom and rising foreign demand, 
the revival of the sugar industry during the middle decades of the century, like 
the economy in general, suffered a sharp reversal with the end of the boom in the 
early 1870s, the impact of the world wide depression of 1873 and then the disas-
trous consequences of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). A finite and depleting 
———— 
13 See P. MACERA, «Las plantaciones azucareras Andinas (1821-1875)», Trabajos de historia 
(4 vols.), Lima, Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1977, vol. IV. 
14 M.J. GONZÁLES [11], p. 22. 
15 See H. RODRIGUEZ PASTOR, Hijos del celeste imperio en el Perú (1850-1900): migración, 
agricultura, mentalidad y explotación, Lima, Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1989. 
16 See M.J. GONZÁLES [11]. 
17 B. ALBERT [9], p. 12. 
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asset, guano reserves finally ran out in the early seventies. In addition in 1874 the 
Chinese coolie trade, which had subjected workers to widespread exploitation 
and abuse, was finally ended due to pressure from Great Britain, China and the 
United States. A year later a severe financial crisis struck Peru as a result of the 
international repercussions of the Panic of 1873 as well as the collapse of the 
guano trade. Bank notes were declared inconvertible, banks began to call in their 
loans and many failed. The deepening financial crisis contributed to the toppling 
in 1876 of Peru’s first fledgling civilian party (Partido Civilista) and government 
(Manuel Pardo y Lavalle 1872-1876) since Independence, which had been spu-
rred by with the guano bourgeoisie’s opposition to military rule. Shortly thereaf-
ter Peru (with Bolivia) went to war against Chile over a border dispute and suffe-
red a devastating loss that set the country back both economically and politically 
to the anarchic years following independence. Exports dropped by more the 50 
percent between 1879 and 1881. Tragically, Peru’s chance for a great economic 
leap forward lay in ashes. 
The war crippled the sugar industry, but as is often the case in times of crisis, 
opportunities abounded for those capable of taking advantage of the situation. This 
proved the case for an entrepreneurial group of growers, some of immigrant origins 
and others Peruvian nationals, who had entered the industry during the guano 
boom. Backed by foreign merchant houses with loans and marketing arrangements, 
they spearheaded a wave of concentration and consolidation in the industry, buying 
out their weaker, often bankrupt competitors, reorganizing production into larger 
economies of scale and generally modernizing their operations between 1885 and 
1930. The war, however, was not the only cause for the amalgamation of the Peru-
vian sugar industry nor was it unique to Peru, as Bill Albert has shown. It was also 
due to relatively low prices on the international market which forced producers 
everywhere to improve productivity through better milling, fabrication and cultiva-
tion techniques, including further economies of scale18. 
The consequences of the post-war revival and advance of the sugar industry 
during this period were manifold. For one thing, the industry became increasingly 
concentrated along the north coast. Even by the end of the first phase of sugar ex-
pansion during the middle decades of the century 65 percent of sugar exports came 
from this region. Still, the central coastal valleys (departments of Ancash and Li-
ma) continued to account for more than half of the sugar consumed domestically. 
Over time, however, cotton came to replace sugar as the dominant crop along the 
central coast by World War I, even if sugar still remained important One reason for 
the shift to the north was the ability of planters there to operate on a year-round 
basis due to the unique ecological conditions there, a fact that gave Peru a competi-
tive edge in the late Nineteenth Century over Cuba and other sugar producing areas 
with seasonal limitations to the growing and harvesting of cane. 
———— 
18 Ibidem, pp. 61-4. 
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As the industry shifted north and began to take on the characteristics of an 
enclave economy, the growing power of the region’s planters was increasingly 
reflected in the reemergence of the Partido Civilista which succeeded in consoli-
dating it control over the state between 1900 and 1919. During this period, 
known as the Aristocratic Republic, two sugar planters were elected president for 
a total of twelve years (Eduardo López de la Romaña, 1899-1903 and José Pardo 
y Barreda, 1904-1908, 1915-1919). In addition several others became ministers 
of state, members of congress, bank board of directors and members of other 
powerful organizations such as the Sociedad Nacional Agraria (SNA), the lobb-
ying group for big landowners and agriculture in the country founded in 1896. 
During the 1890s Peru experienced considerable economic expansion which 
included industrial development, the reestablishment of banking, the formation of 
insurance companies, a new stock exchange and public utilities19. The sugar in-
dustry participated in this progress, even though world prices were relatively low 
and labor shortages a continuing problem. Forced to improve productivity to stay 
competitive on the world market, planters mobilized capital (both domestic and 
foreign), began to recruit a domestic wage labor force, consolidated landholdings 
and constructed larger, more modern ingenios. For example, the Gildemeister 
operations in the Chicama Valley near the city of Trujillo grew in size from less 
than a thousand hectares in 1850 to almost 41,000 in 1927. There was also a 
sharp decline in the number of ingenios which fell from 62 in 1895 to 38 by 1913 
while average annual production per sugar mill rose from 1,171 to 4,720 tons20. 
At the same time, plantations modernized operations through technological deve-
lopment and innovation including larger processing mills, steam-powered trac-
tors, railroads and modern port facilities. 
In some ways labor was the most difficult problem confronting planters after 
the Pacific War. Labor recruitment, which had always been in short supply on the 
coast and had necessitated the importation first of Chinese coolies (and some 
experiments with Japanese indentures around 1900), was finally resolved after 
the war with the recruitment of Indian peasants from the sierra. Gradually a free 
wage labor system replaced indenture, as capitalist relations of production ex-
panded21. At first, peasants had been reluctant to leave their small mountain plots 
for work on the hot coast where they were susceptible to tropical diseases like 
yellow fever. However, as the highland population began to grow rapidly in the 
late Nineteenth Century, increasing man-land ratios forced many highlanders to 
seek migratory, wage work on the coastal plantations. Planters used a variety of 
———— 
19 See R. THORP and G. BERTRAM, Peru 1890-1977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy, 
New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1978. 
20 B. ALBERT [9], p. 110. 
21 See C.D. SCOTT, «The Decline of an Export Industry, or the Growth of Peruvian Sugar 
Consumption in the Long Run», The Journal of Developing Studies, 21/2, London, 1985, pp. 253-
81, and B. ALBERT [9]. 
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techniques to tap this growing reserve of seasonal surplus labor, some of which 
were coercive in nature such as enganche —a form of debt entrapment through 
cash advances—. Although much denounced by a generation of indigenista (pro 
Indian) reformers during the 1910s and 1920s and later the subject of a lively 
debate in the historical literature, it appears that labor recruitment was essentially 
«voluntary,» relying more on material incentives than coercion22. 
In time many migrants actually took up residence on the plantations with their 
families, creating a permanent work force in the sugar industry which was subjec-
ted to the exploitation characteristic of early capitalist work regimes in the Ameri-
cas. Over time harsh conditions, mitigated to some extent by planter paternalism, 
led to collective labor agitation for better wages and working conditions. On seve-
ral occasions worker protests erupted in to violent strikes that rocked, for example, 
the Chicama Valley outside Trujillo in 1912, 1921 and 1931. Eventually labor 
unions were established under the leadership first of Anarchists and later the APRA 
party, founded in 1923 by Trujillo native Victor Raul Haya de la Torre23. 
World War I proved a boon to Peruvian sugar growers as European production 
of beet sugar, a major competitor to Peruvian sugar in metropolitan markets, decli-
ned sharply, pushing up demand and prices. Sugar remained extremely profitable 
for exporters in Peru throughout the war, as global production dropped steadily 
from almost 17 million tons in 1913-1914 to a little more than 12 million tons in 
1919-1920. The industry was particularly well positioned to exploit this market 
opportunity since it had made substantial investments in the industry after 1908. 
Moreover, the opening of the Panama Canal greatly reduced the distance and there-
fore transportation costs between Peru and the United States and Europe. Peruvian 
growers took advantage of the opportunity by expanding acreage devoted to sugar 
23 percent between 1913 and 1919 while increasing their labor force from almost 
21,000 to a little over 26,000 during the same period24. The down side of the sugar 
bonanza was an increasing scarcity and rising prices for domestic food stuffs, as 
land along the coast was converted from combustibles to sugar cane. 
This expansion came at the expense of small holders (agricultores) and the 
few remaining Indian communities in the region whose increasingly valuable 
lands were coveted by plantations’ insatiable demand for land, water and labor. A 
similar process of dislocation and proletarization can be found in other countries 
such as Cuba and Mexico which led to explosive political protest and even revo-
lution. This was the case, for example, in Mexico towards the end of the Porfiria-
to (1876-1910) when peasant leader Emiliano Zapata rose up in defense of ejidos 
———— 
22 See A.J. BAUER, «Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems of Peonage and Oppres-
sion», Hispanic American Historical Review, 59/1, Durham, 1979, pp. 34-64; B. ALBERT [9], and 
M.J. GONZÁLES [11]. 
23 See P.F. KLAREN, Las haciendas azucareras y los orígenes del APRA, Lima, Instituto de Es-
tudios Peruanos, 1972. 
24 B. ALBERT [9], p. 127. 
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that had been stolen or otherwise acquired by the unrestrained expansion of sugar 
estates in the state of Morelos25. Enclosure and labor agitation combined with 
merchant distress at unfair competition from the plantation bazaar at Casa Gran-
de from goods imported through a nearby duty free port concession granted to 
the Gildemeister interests by Congress in 1917 fueled widespread popular re-
sentment in the region which would have important political consequences du-
ring the Great Depression26. 
The steady rise in sugar prices during the war reached a climax in the so ca-
lled «dance of the millions» in 1919-1920 when, in the words of Sidney W. 
Mintz, 
 
«The world market price of sugar rose to dizzying heights, then dropped 
almost to zero, in a classical demonstration of oversupply and speculation»27. 
 
In Peru, exports of sugar doubled between 1918 and 1919 and by another 87 
percent the following year, reaching a value of over 15 million of soles which al-
most equaled in one year the total value of sugar exports for the entire period of the 
war! Growers reaped enormous profits from this bonanza such the Aspillaga opera-
tions at Cayalti which skyrocketed from an average of LP 90,000 between 1914 to 
1917 to over 222,000 in 191928. Boom quickly went bust, however, as post war 
European beet sugar production recovered, increasing supplies on the world market 
and causing the price of sugar to plummet from the middle of 1920. 
Worsening the situation in Peru, growers had invested heavily in increased 
capacity, assuming incorrectly that the high post-war price of sugar would conti-
nue into the 1920s. In the event, the opposite happened, presaging the onset of 
the Great Depression. In an effort to reduce costs, sugar growers let workers go 
and lowered wages (after having raised them 33 percent in the late war years) in 
a general economic environment of rising post-war inflation, causing labor pro-
tests that exploded into major strikes and violence in the Chicama Valley in 
1921. Moreover, serious flooding along the north coast in 1926-1927 further 
harmed the industry which would shortly face the full impact of the collapse of 
commodity prices with the onset of the Great Depression in 1930. 
Peru in general and the sugar industry in particular were hit hard by the de-
pression of the 1930s. The country defaulted on its foreign debt in 1932, deva-
luing the currency, which did serve to promote a rebound in the export sector 
beginning in 1933, led by cotton. However, Peruvian sugar exporters lost access 
to British and United States markets as a result of preferential tariffs established 
———— 
25 See J. WOMACK, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution, New York, Vintage, 1971. 
26 See P.F. KLAREN [3]. 
27 S.W. MINTZ, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History, New York, 
Penguin, 1985, p. XX. 
28 B. ALBERT [9], p. 200. 
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in the British Empire and with Cuba in 1934, respectively. Producers did succeed 
in lobbying the government to pass a law exempting the industry from taxes in 
1934, but world sugar prices continued to decline steadily until 1937. This led 
many growers, particularly in the central and southern coast to switch to cotton 
cultivation, aided by government credits beginning in 1934. In general, sugar 
cultivation declined 10 percent and virtually disappeared from the valleys around 
the Lima market whose suppliers now shifted to Lambayeque in the north29. 
Politically, the onset of the depression caused the fall of the Augusto B. Le-
guía government whose eleven year reign known as the Oncenio (1919-1930) 
was ended by a coup in 1931. A period of extreme political polarization and ins-
tability followed, as elections that year for the first time ushered the urban masses 
into the political arena with the rise of the populist APRA party whose main base 
of support came from the sugar enclaves of the north coast. The party’s attraction 
there was due in part to the fact that the party leader and founder Haya de la To-
rre came from Trujillo. But it can also be explained by the rise of the new sugar 
proletariat and dislocation of the old middle class of small holders and merchants 
who responded to the nationalist appeals of APRA whose leaders railed against 
the foreign control of the export dependent Peruvian economy that had collapsed 
into depression and mass unemployment. Anti-imperialism struck a cord particu-
larly in and around Trujillo where foreign sugar companies (Grace and Gilde-
meister) had consolidated the land tenure system into sugar production between 
1870 and the 1930s. By the end of that decade there were only three large estates 
milling their own sugar, controlled by these two firms. 
The impact of the depression further deepened the appeal of populism and 
nationalism throughout the urban, modernized sectors of the country (coast and 
export enclaves) while polarizing relations between capital and labor30. After the 
narrow defeat of APRA candidate, Haya de la Torre, in the 1931 elections by the 
popular leader of the coup against the Leguia dictatorship, Luis M. Sanchez Ce-
rro, a rebellion broke out among Aprista supporters in Trujillo, led by sugar wor-
kers who claimed that the election had been fraudulent. Thousands of party mili-
tants died in the army led repression that followed, partially in reprisal for the 
execution of several captured army officers by the rebels. While APRA was for-
ced underground for the next decade, relations between the armed forces (and the 
oligarchy) and the party were hostile for a generation or longer. Not until the end 
of World War II (1945) was the party allowed to participate in the governing 
coalition of the popularly elected, reformist government of José Luis Bustamante 
y Rivero (1945-1948)31. 
———— 
29 R. THORP and G. BERTRAM [19], pp. 170-3. 
30 See S. STEIN, Populism in Peru: The Emergence of the Masses and the Politics of Social 
Control, Madison, Wisconsin Univ. Press, 1980. 
31 See D.M. MASTERSON, Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro 
to Sendero Luminoso, New York, Greenwood Press, 1991. 
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The Trujillo Revolution of 1932 in the heart of the sugar zone may be compa-
red to the Zapatista revolt in the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the social un-
rest in Cuba that led to the downfall of the Machado dictatorship (1928-1933) in 
the populist revolution of 1933. In both instances, the rebellions drew on some of 
the same popular forces that were born from similar social dislocations brought 
on by the expansion of the sugar leviathan of the early Twentieth Century. 
The Second World War dramatically improved the fortunes of the sugar in-
dustry. Improved prices, partly the result of the International Sugar Agreement of 
1937 and higher yields due to the spread of a new cane variety, actually predated 
the war. Market oversupply of the 1930s was now replaced by shortage and a 
sellers market for Peruvian sugar. Not only did the traditional British, Chilean 
and United States market for Peru’s sugar improve, but other non-traditional 
markets in Latin America opened up. Despite this upturn in the fortunes of sugar 
exports during the war, it did not match the World War I boom. Volume did not 
grow in spite of improved prices because of various local constraints, including 
wartime shortages of machinery and other inputs as well as government price 
controls on domestic consumption that inhibited investment and modernization. 
At the same time, the industry was subjected to sharp increases in taxation and 
government regulations aimed at protecting land devoted to food production (not 
subject conversion to sugar or cotton for exports)32. 
During the Bustamante y Rivero government (1945-1948), which ushered in 
a brief period of populist democratic reform, unions under the control of APRA 
(Federacion de Trabajadores Azucareros del Peru) once again appeared on the 
sugar estates after being outlawed for more than a decade. As a result, conflict 
between labor-capital intensified in the immediate post-war years, and it would 
not be until the early 1960s that unionization would be institutionalized, as APRA 
slowly gained a measure of political power, particularly after its Convivencia 
negotiated with the Manuel Prado y Ubarteche government (1956-1962). 
During the early 1950s production began to soar again, due to increased in-
vestment, rising yields and increasing prices due to the Korean War (1950-1953). 
However, the end of the war brought lower prices, although growers continued to 
expand acreage as during World War I in anticipation of higher prices. The Ma-
nuel A. Odria government (1948-1958) undertook to expand irrigation projects 
begun during the Leguia years, with most of the new lands devoted to either cot-
ton or sugar production, especially in Lambayeque. By this time a major new 
factor in the equation of sugar production and exports was the rapid growth of the 
domestic market (7-8 percent annually) in the late 1950s which caused the level 
of exports (and foreign exchange) to decline steadily. Sugar exports declined 
from a high of 87 percent in the 1930s to 30 percent in the 1970s and 10 percent 
in the 1990s. The one bright spot for exports occurred as a result of the opening 
———— 
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of the American market to Peruvian sugar after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 
when Cuba’s quota was revoked by the United States Congress. At the same ti-
me, the relatively high price of sugar in the North American market (roughly 
three times higher than the world market) was crucial to maintaining profitability 
in the Peruvian sugar industry. Another important trend in the industry since the 
1940s was the increase in mechanization of the industry which lowered costs, but 
at the expense of displacing workers. 
The Peruvian Revolution of 1968 transformed the sugar industry in a major 
way. Taking power by way of a coup led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, the 
armed forces aimed to undertake radical reforms to restructure the country. Repea-
ting the words of the eighteenth century Indian rebel Tupac Amaru II, «Peasant, the 
landlord will eat no more from your poverty», Velasco y Alvarado dramatically 
announced on June 24, 1969 (Peru’s national day of the Indian) a sweeping agrarian 
reform decree. More extensive than any other in Latin America since the Cuban 
Revolution of 1959, the reform began by expropriating the eight largest sugar plan-
tations on the coast and converting them into cooperatives. 
Compensation to the former owners was based upon the landowners’ decla-
red valuation of their holdings for tax purposes, thereby punishing the wides-
pread practice of tax evasion. For example, the Grace Corporation valued their 
two estates at $26 million while the government appraisal was $10.1. Compensa-
tion was mainly in the form of Agrarian Reform bonds issued at a 4-6 percent 
rate of interest over twenty to thirty years. However, to incentive the transfer of 
capital from agriculture to industry (another expressed goal of the revolution), the 
bonds could be converted to cash invested into government approved industrial 
projects (along with an additional 50 percent cash outlay by the bondholder). 
Most owners, including Grace, considered the compensation bonds worthless, 
given the anticipated level of inflation over time. In the case of Grace (and other 
expropriated enterprises like the International Petroleum Company or IPC), this 
set the stage for a conflict between the United States and the Peruvian govern-
ment which, among other things, led to a lowering of the sugar quota by the Uni-
ted States Congress in retaliation. 
In addition to promoting the diversification of the economy away from agri-
culture into industrial development, the new government hoped to strike a mortal 
blow against the powerful landed elite and its foreign allies, whose core consisted 
of the sugar barons of the coast. It was also aimed at the APRA party which had 
been the avowed enemy of the military ever since the Trujillo Revolution of 
1932. Indeed, one of the reasons for the coup had been the prospect that Haya de 
la Torre would win the presidency in the elections scheduled for 1969. 
Since World War II APRA had been reluctant to institute an agrarian reform that 
would effect the sugar plantations where it controlled 75 percent of the union wor-
kers and derived its major block of voters (the so called «solido norte Aprista»). In 
fact, the party had entered into an alliance with Conservative forces in the so-called 
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Convivencia pact of 1956, to block any proposed agrarian reform legislation that 
might effect the sugar plantations. APRA leaders argued that such a move would 
jeopardize the high productivity of these estates where workers —their political 
clients— were among the highest paid agricultural laborers in the country. 
Politically, the expropriation had mixed results for the Velasco Alvarado go-
vernment. It did deal a crippling blow to the landed elites, particular since the re-
form was extended to the entire country, overturning centuries of hacendado power. 
On the other hand, APRA continued to exercise influence in the sugar unions whose 
leaders assumed positions in the new cooperatives, including the National Center of 
Sugar Cooperatives. This occurred because APRA pressured the government to 
allow the newly formed cooperatives to elect their own leaders33. 
Agrarian Production Cooperatives (CAP) were established on the expropria-
ted haciendas, each collectively owned by the membership largely composed of 
the pre-Reform permanent labor force. The government appointed administrators 
who were subject to oversight by policy-making councils composed of CAP 
members, the majority of whom at first were also appointed by the government. 
Various conflicts within the new sugar enterprises emerged almost immediately. 
For example, cooperative members complained that the new government appoin-
ted managers who were basically state bureaucrats lacking managerial, entrepre-
nurial or marketing experience, often acted in high handed, abusive ways similar 
to the former owners and managers whom they had replaced. In response, they 
organized strikes to force the government in 1972 to give unions a voice in ma-
nagement and to permit elections for all council seats. 
Another source of conflict was the place of casual laborers, nearby small hol-
ders and tenants as well as landless migrants from the highlands who worked on 
a seasonal, part time basis on the former estates and who were left out of the re-
form by their exclusion from membership in the CAP. This created a dual labor 
system of privileged permanent workers who enjoyed year-round jobs security 
and received higher wages (which they themselves set) and generous fringe bene-
fits (housing, food rations etc) and an essentially second class group of casual 
laborers who received lower wages, less benefits and no share of the enterprises’ 
profits. The former not only resisted the admission of outsiders into the CAP but 
supported investment in labor saving machinery that would reduce the seasonal 
work force. Such inequities led to land invasions by the eventuales onto lands 
owned by the cooperatives, resulting in outbreaks of violence34. 
Government policy proved another obstacle to the reformed industry. Becau-
se the government between 1971-1975 controlled the price and the amount of 
sugar produced internally, which now amounted to 90 percent of domestic pro-
———— 
33 C. GRAHAM, Peru’s APRA: Parties, Politics, and the Elusive Quest for Democracy, Boulder, 
Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 41-2. 
34 See D.P. WERLICH, Peru: A Short History, Carbondale, Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1978. 
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duction, with the residual 10 percent left to export, the industry was unable to 
benefit from higher international prices in 1974-1975. As a result, sugar CAP had 
negative profits for the period 1976-1980 when average gross profits could have 
been 130 percent higher35. 
Moreover, higher taxes levied by the government sharply increased the fiscal 
burden on sugar CAP. For example, taxes paid by these CAP between 1971 and 
1975 fluctuated between 24.2 percent (1972) and 72.6 (1975) of their gross pro-
fits. One estimate had them paying at a rate of seven times that of agrarian reform 
enterprises in the highlands and upper jungle. Finally, managerial authority was 
severely weakened as a result of the reforms with serious negative consequences 
for labor discipline and productivity. For example, incentives for CAP members 
were not correlated to effort or efficiency which made little difference in indivi-
dual or family income36. Indeed, CAP often voted their members rapid increases 
in monetary wages that were unrelated to profits or productivity, expanded em-
ployment on the cooperatives (to their relatives and kin) and devoted more of 
their work day to their own personal plots on the estates, thereby reducing the 
number of hours laboring for the enterprise. Finally, corruption became a serious 
problem, both at the managerial level and among workers who appropriated 
tools, fertilizer and other items from the coops for their own use37. 
As a result of these and other difficulties, the sugar industry recorded an ove-
rall loss of $17 million in 1976, severely weakening the financial condition of 
many cooperatives. By March 1977, conditions had deteriorated to the point that 
the government declared the sugar industry in a state of emergency. Two years 
later, after serious droughts in 1976 and 1978-1980, six cooperatives declared 
bankruptcy, and in 1980 the government for the first time in history was obliged 
to import sugar for domestic consumption. Thus, five years after the price of su-
gar reached its highest level on the world market in 1974, the industry was plun-
ged into a crisis comparable to those experienced in the 1920s and 1930s38. 
The industry continued to decline in the 1980s and 1990s when successive 
civilian regimes (Fernando Belaunde, 1980-1985, Alan García Pérez, 1985-1990, 
and Alberto Fujimori, 1990-2000) replaced the armed forces in the national go-
vernment. For example, overall production dropped in 1990 to half the one mi-
llion tons produced in the bannere year 1974 while the cooperatives had accumu-
lated a debt of over $100 million by 1987. In a relatively short time Peru had 
———— 
35 M.E. CARTER and E. ÁLVAREZ, «Changing Paths: The Decollectivization of Agrarian Re-
form Agriculture in Coastal Peru», W.C. THIESENHUSEN (ed.), Searching for Agrarian Reform in 
Latin America, Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1989, pp. 168-9. 
36 J. SHEAHAN, Searching for a Better Society: The Peruvian Economy from 1950, University 
Park, Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1999, p. 64. 
37 See J.M. MEJÍA, Cooperativas azucareras: crisis y alternativas, Lima, Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos, 1992. 
38 C.D. SCOTT [21], p. 260. 
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gone from an exporter to an importer of sugar with the attendant loss in foreign 
exchange while workers suffered parallel losses in wages, benefits and overall 
standard of living. Similarly, a vast contingent of under employed, temporary 
workers had grown up in newly constituted pueblos jovenes or shanty towns at 
the margins of the sugar estates, constituting yet another dimension of the enor-
mous crisis buffeting the industry39. 
In conclusion, the 1969 agrarian reform and subsequent shift from a capitalist to 
a state-led cooperativist model of organization represented a transformative event in 
the evolution of Peru’s sugar industry. Up until then the industry had been characte-
rized by a number of features: dependency on the external market, decapitalization 
—rather than reinvestment— of profits to other sectors of the economy, a regional 
hegemony of the 12 or so sugar companies that dominated the industry, a protectio-
nist state under the influence of the powerful sugar barons and an unstable ecologi-
cal environment (droughts, floods etc) that required a large margin of safety on the 
part of each enterprise. During this period, the industry constituted a major, if decli-
ning, share of the country’s exports and concomitant contributor to its balance of 
payments. This position was steadily eroded by the expansion of the internal market 
which consumed an ever increasing portion of national production, reaching 90 
percent by the time of the 1969 agrarian reform40. 
Thereafter, the subsequent radical shift to a cooperativist model transformed 
the state from a protector (Estado protector) to a patron of the industry (Estado 
patrón). There is a considerable debate in the literature over whether the state 
directed cooperativist model has been the primary cause of the industry’s decline 
over the last twenty five years or, as José Manuel Mejia argues, the result of a 
major structural crisis that requires major changes from the past.41 With the re-
turn to civilian government since 1980 there have been various proposals to re-
form the cooperativist model, ranging from privatization and parcelization (deco-
llectivization) under Belaunde’s policies of neo-liberalism and return to the free 
market to various proposals to reform, reactivate and revitalize the cooperative 
structure of the industry under the populist administration of García Pérez. None 
of these efforts, all of them distinct in their approach and governing philosophy, 
however, nor further liberalization under Fujimori in the nineties, bore fruit and 
were subsequently abandoned. Today the industry continues in a state of crisis 
with little prospect of returning to its former heyday as a relatively efficient, 
prosperous industry that at one time served as a major foreign exchange and capi-
tal accumulator in the Peruvian economy, albeit with a history of market export 
dependency, labor exploitation and monopolistic characteristics that concentrated 
wealth and power in a very few hands. 
———— 
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Since the early Colonial times sugar production has been a key sector in the Peruvian export 
economy. This article analyzes its evolution as from the beginning of its modern phase by mid 19th 
Century, its consolidation in the Northern coastal region, and its concentration in scale-economy 
plants. The prosperity of this type of production contributed to the formation of both an oligarchy 
which governed the country until 1968, and the populist party (APRA) and its electoral basis (the 
so-called «Aprista North»). In the sixties Velasco Alvarado’s military revolution nationalized the 
sugar industry, which underwent structural changes leading to a serious crisis in the eighties that 
has not been overcome up-todate. 
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